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The focus of the present work is to study the impact of the second-hand market the collusive 
behavior. I analyze firms’ preferences for having an active second-hand market and whether 
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The focus of the present work is to study the implications of the second-hand market the
collusive behavior.1 Whereas most of the previous literature focuses on the implications of
the second-hand market on a monopolist￿ s pro￿tability, I analyze ￿rms￿preferences for having
an active second-hand market and whether policies (i.e. leasing policy, buy-back policy and
warranty policy) that a⁄ect the functioning of the second-hand market strengthen collusion.
Collective incentives to adopt these policies may not necessarily coincide with individual
incentives to achieve a higher pro￿t. It follows that manufacturers of durable goods may
increase the scope of the secondary market, even though a monopolist may have the opposite
incentive.
A large strand of the industrial organization literature analyzes the durable-goods market
in the presence of a monopolist. Once the quality (or the durability) of goods deteriorates,
the existence of the second-hand market is endogenously explained by introducing consumer
heterogeneity in the valuation of quality. As units age and quality decreases, goods are
traded from high-valuation to low-valuation consumers on competitive secondary markets,
allowing owners to update to their preferred quality. Di⁄erent authors (Waldman, 1996a,
1997; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a; Anderson, S. and V. Ginsburgh 1994) have shown that in
this context the monopolist may increase monopoly pro￿t with the presence of a secondary
market because he can better allocate the good amongst consumers and take advantage of
an indirect form of price discrimination. However, the potential substitutability of di⁄erent
vintages means the availability of used units lowers the monopolist￿ s new unit price. One
possible response is for the monopolist to reduce the durability of new units. This reduces
the substitutability of new and used units and allows the ￿rm to increase the price for new
units. Another possibility is for the ￿rm to reduce, or even eliminate, the availability of used
units where the return is again a higher new unit price. A real-world practice along these
lines is the lease-only policy (Johnson and Waldman, 2003, Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a);2 that
is, the policy of leasing but refusing to sell output. However, there are in fact many examples
in which manufacturers seem to intervene in the opposite direction and encourage an active
second-hand market. For example, many manufacturers allow transfers of warranty coverage
between owners. Also, car manufacturers encourage dealers to accept trade-ins and pursue
policies that seem designed to facilitate transactions in the used market. In￿nity and Lexus
extend warranty coverage to used cars. IBM, Dell and other computer manufacturers sell
1Bresnahan (1987) and Sudhir, analyzing the American automobile industry, observe a predominant
collusive behavior among car manufacturers in the sale of their goods.
2When the monopolist o⁄ers a lease-only policy he actually sells the service ￿ ow of the (new or used)
goods for the length of the contract period. In such a situation there is practically no second-hand market
because no new durable goods are sold on the primary market.
2refurbished equipment and provide warranties for used goods.
One aspect that is missing from the previous literature is the presence of multiple ￿rms
competing in such markets. The incentives to interfere with or eliminate an active second
market will be di⁄erent if we consider monopoly incentives or oligopoly incentives. Collective
incentives to sustain collusion over time and monopoly incentives to achieve higher pro￿t do
not necessarily move in the same direction. In spite of the fact that a monopolist manufac-
turer has an incentive to eliminate the availability of used units, sometimes manufacturers
operate in the opposite direction.
With durable goods and no second-hand market, Ausbel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul
(1987) show that intertemporal substitutability in demand facilitates collusion via rational
expectations on the part of consumers. The possibility of intertemporally substituting con-
sumption (i.e. decide when to buy durable goods based on the expected price for new goods
in the future) constrains the maximum price that a defector can charge in the defection
period, hence it reduces the bene￿t that the defector can gain by deviating. Consumers will
forgo the utility of buying a new good today if they expect its price to be substantially lower
tomorrow.
The second-hand market introduces a di⁄erent channel through which the gain from
defection is reduced. The presence of a second-hand market a⁄ects demand for new goods
in two ways: the buyers of new goods can sell them when they become used and the resale
value positively in￿ uences the demand for new goods (resale e⁄ect); on the other hand, used
goods constitute a cheap (imperfect) substitute for new goods and this depresses the demand
for new goods (substitution e⁄ect). The ￿rst aspect introduces dynamic considerations into
consumer demand: the producer takes into account that the quantity sold in the current
period has an indirect, as well as a direct, e⁄ect on current pro￿ts. A higher level of current
production lowers tomorrow￿ s secondary market price (the current production of new goods
adds to supply on the future secondary market) and erodes consumers￿willingness to pay
for a new good today by reducing its resale value. Because the value of a new good today
depends on its expected price on tomorrow￿ s secondary market, a ￿rm￿ s current pro￿ts also
depend on its own future production, which can in￿ uence the secondary-market price. In this
context, if ￿rms maintain a collusive price under the threat of a price war, then consumers
may foresee price wars in the wake of defection and possibly lower their willingness to pay
for new goods. The menace of a price war may induce consumers to expect lower prices for
used goods. The presence of cheap new goods after a defection will make used goods less
desirable and drive down their equilibrium price. This a⁄ects consumers￿willingness to pay
for new goods and the punishment is felt even at the time of the defection. In this setting,
punishments harsher even than grim trigger strategies are possible.3 By threatening to price
3Similarly harsher strategies could also be used without the presence of a secondary market as they will
3below marginal cost in the post-deviation period, competing ￿rms can drive the expected
future price of used goods to zero and reduce the pro￿t from new goods in the defection
period by completely removing the resale-value component of demand.
Durable goods in my model live for two periods and depreciate in the second period.
There are two groups of consumers with di⁄erent taste for quality. The second-hand market
improves the e¢ ciency of allocation of new and used products among heterogenous con-
sumers. Therefore, ￿rms sell new goods more frequently and may achieve higher pro￿t even
if the monopoly price is lower with the secondary market. With durable goods (with or
without a secondary market), the extra incentive to sustain collusion is provided by the
extra punishment in￿ icted on the defector in the defection period, which is absent in a non-
durable environment. Hence, the ￿rms￿choice or whether to have a second-hand market or
not depends on the size of the punishment in￿ icted in the defection period. In particular,
the ability to enforce collusion depends on the possibility of consumers to intertemporally
substitute consumption if there is no second-hand market, or on the equilibrium price of
used goods if there is.
The model predicts that for collusive purposes having an active second-hand market is
preferable every time the marginal cost of production is either high or low and there is a
sharp reduction in the quality of the durable good over time. In general, the second-hand
market will be preferred for collusive purposes whenever consumer utility from keeping the
used good is low because it is costly to keep the good over time. More speci￿cally, if the
unitary pro￿t from selling a good is low because of high marginal cost, the relative drop in
price in the defection period is bigger in the presence of a secondary market, hence collusion
is sustained under a broader range of parameters in this case. However, monopoly pro￿t is
likely to be lower with a second-hand market in such a situation. The ability to collude is
also higher with the secondary market if the marginal cost and the quality of used goods
are low. If the quality of the used good is low and there is no secondary market, consumers￿
incentives to intertemporally substitute consumption decrease, as does the leverage that
￿rms can use to punish the defector in the defection period. Moreover, consumers with a
used good (and with no possibility to resell it) are tempted to buy a new good and scrap
the used one. If the marginal cost is also low, the defector has an incentive to further lower
the price in the defection period to sell the good to all consumers (with and without the
good) and maximize its pro￿t. In such a situation, the punishment in￿ icted to the defector
in the defection period is minimal, so the ability to collude compared with a second-hand
market is decreased. In particular if the marginal cost is low enough, ￿rms will prefer to
sell new goods to all consumers every period by lowering the price of the good. Consumers
always scrap a used good to buy a new good with consequent welfare loss. If this is the
a⁄ect the willingness of consumers to intertemporally substitute consumption.
4case even with durable goods, there is no intertemporal link in demand and no further
incentive to sustain collusion than in the standard Bertrand case. In contrast, with the
presence of a secondary market, ￿rms always achieve a higher pro￿t because of the more
e¢ cient allocation and consequent increase in total welfare. Consumers never scrap the used
good but rather they resell it to low-valuation consumers. Therefore, the demand for new
units preserves the dynamic component and consequently the ability to enforce collusion is
reinforced. More generally, the pre-eminence of the second-hand market both for collusion
purposes and pro￿tability arises every time the utility that consumers get from keeping the
used good is low, either because the quality of the good is low or because it is costly to keep
the good over time. I show that in those markets where
Finally, I consider an environment in which ￿rms may implement di⁄erent strategies
aimed at interfering with the secondary market even if they cannot prevent a priori the pos-
sibility for consumers to resell their goods in a decentralized market. I argue that the ability
to collude and the maximum achievable pro￿t change as di⁄erent policies are undertaken by
￿rms in order to a⁄ect the secondary market. In particular, a policy aimed at eliminating
the secondary market, such as a leasing policy, would eliminate the dynamic consideration
in consumer decisions (with leasing contracts, the manufacturer is able to sell only the ￿ ow
of service derived from products) and lessen the possibility of collusion: the absence of a
second-hand market reduces the punishment that can be in￿ icted on a defector. In particu-
lar, leasing reduces the range of the discount factor over which collusion is sustainable, but it
will always increase pro￿t with respect to a selling-only policy. On the other hand, the range
of the discount factor that makes collusion sustainable is enlarged under the buy-back policy
and transferable warranties. These policies preserve the existence of a secondary market,
increase the market value of used units and consequently the extra punishment in￿ icted on
the defector in the defection period. However, both policies are costly to implement (unlike
the leasing policy), and therefore they do not always generate a higher pro￿t.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I develop the main mechanism that
reinforces collusion through the secondary market. In Section 3, I study ￿rms￿incentives
to eliminate the secondary market by comparing the previous results with Gul￿ s (1987) and
Ausubel Deneckere￿ s (1987) results adapted in the present context. In Section 4, I study
di⁄erent policies aimed at in￿ uencing the second-hand market: speci￿cally I look at leasing
policy and buy-back policy and I analyze the incentive for manufacturers to o⁄er warranty
coverage for used goods. Section 5 concludes.
52 The Model
Consider an in￿nite-horizon discrete-time model with in￿nitely lived consumers, one durable
good and one other good as numeraire. The quality of the durable good is q 2 f￿;1g; assume
that it lasts for two periods only. The durable good is ￿new￿during the period in which
it is produced, ￿used￿during the following period and worthless thereafter. Durability is
associated with the quality of used goods. The quality of new units is normalized to 1 and
the quality of used units is ￿ 2 (0;1). Suppose there are G ￿rms producing durable goods.
The ￿rms face no capacity constraints and produce durable goods at a constant marginal
cost c > 0: All ￿rms simultaneously set their price at the beginning of every period and are
committed to selling to all interested consumers at that price during that period. Let pN
g;t be
the price of new goods set by ￿rm g in period t. The lowest price in a period is the market








and all consumers buy from ￿rms charging that price.4 If more than one ￿rm sets a price
equal to the market price, then sales are split equally between all such ￿rms. All ￿rms are
risk-neutral and discount future pro￿ts by the same discount factor ￿f. Hence, each ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t in a market period is simply its sales multiplied by the di⁄erence between its price
and its marginal cost. Let DN
t be the demand for new goods in period t; the industry pro￿t







On the demand side there are two groups of consumers, denoted by h and l, with masses
nh and nl. Each consumer wishes to buy at most one unit of the good in each period.
Consumers di⁄er as to their valuation of the good. Consumers in group h have a high
willingness to pay ￿h and those in group l have a lower willingness to pay for each unit,
i.e. ￿l < ￿h. Assume that nh < nl in order to guarantee that the equilibrium price on the
second-hand market (when it exists) is positive.
The consumption decision is a function of current prices, price history and the stock of
used goods available in each period. Consumers form correct expectations concerning future
prices and anticipate that by buying a new product in t they can collect its resale value in
t + 1 as extra income whenever resale is feasible. Each consumer￿ s current utility is quasi-
linear in income ut = q￿i +yt where yt is the endowment of income in period t: The lifetime
utility of a consumer is given by U =
P
￿
t￿1ut, where ￿ is the discount factor common to
all consumers.
To simplify the analysis, I focus on stationary equilibria in which new and used good
prices are time invariant (see for example Dutta, Matros and Weibull, 2007, Hendel and
4I assume that ￿rms cannot price discriminate among consumers.
6Lizzeri, 1999a, 1999b, Johnson and Waldman, 2003). The values of all parameters are
common knowledge.
In each period there are two markets: an imperfectly competitive market for new goods
and a perfectly competitive market for used goods. The market for used goods allows
high-valuation consumers to trade in their old units for new ones, and permits low-valuation
consumers to purchase used units in every period. All consumers have access to both markets.
There are no transaction costs in either market. Given the form of utility, consumers di⁄er
only in their preference for quality.
Equilibrium.
Firms know all past prices announced in all earlier periods (in particular, ￿rms hold
correct expectations along the induced price path and after unilateral deviations from this
path), the stock of used goods available on the market at the beginning of each period, as
well as the actions chosen by consumers in the past. This information de￿nes the state of
the game played by G ￿rms. A pure behavior strategy for a ￿rm is accordingly a function
that speci￿es the price to be set in each period t, conditional upon the state in that period.
Firms￿and consumers￿strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if, in all pe-
riods and states, each ￿rm maximizes its expected discounted future stream of pro￿ts and
each consumer maximizes his own utility, given all other players￿strategies. Notice that if
the current state depends on the stock of goods available then the strategic interaction is
not repeated.5
In general, any price between marginal cost and the monopoly price can be sustained as a
subgame perfect equilibrium in grim trigger strategies. However, for simplicity and without
loss of generality, I shall focus on the monopoly outcome. To focus attention on the most
relevant cases, assume:
￿ (a1) the monopolist has no incentive to sell new goods to low-valuation type consumers
(i.e. ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)nh > ((1 + ￿￿)￿l ￿ c)
nh+nl
2 > 0)
￿ (a2) it could never be socially optimal to sell new units to all low-valuation types if
any used units were available, i.e. c > (1 ￿ ￿)￿l.
The presence of vertically di⁄erentiated goods (new and used goods), along with consumer
heterogeneity, will create the opportunity for trade in a decentralized secondary market. Of
course the possibility of getting positive utility from the presence of both new and used
goods will constrain the monopolist in terms of the maximum price that he can charge on
the primary market: The used good represents a cheaper alternative for the new product.
5See Dutta, Matros and Weibull, 2007 for further discussion.
7Since the utility function is quasi-linear and there are no transaction costs, consumers
separate their current decision from their future decisions and determine their optimal con-
sumption by simply comparing the ￿ ow of utility that they derive from each possible choice.





From the previous lemma, and given a stationary environment, consumers￿choices will
be the same at every date along the equilibrium path, i.e. high-valuation type consumers
buy new units in every period and low-type consumers buy used units (for applications of
the same framework see Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994), Esteban and Shum (2007), Hendel
and Lizzeri (1999a, 1999b), and Waldman (1996a, 1997), among others). A generalization of
the model, where frictions in the secondary market make consumers￿replacement infrequent
is analyzed in Hendel and Lizzeri (1999b), Schiraldi (2008) and Stolyarov (2002).6
The timing of the game is as follows. In each period, ￿rms simultaneously announce
the price for a new unit of output. A second-hand market opens up where prices equate
supply and demand; consumers simultaneously decide whether or not to buy a new good
and whether or not to buy or sell a used good on the second-hand market. In each period,
the supply of used goods depends on the new goods produced in the previous period. The
price on the second-hand market, pU
t , is an endogenous variable determined by equating
supply and demand.
Monopoly.
Proposition 1 The price that maximizes the monopoly present discounted pro￿t in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium is pm = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h + pU + ￿pU 8t. The equilibrium price on the
secondary market is pU = ￿￿l; 8t:
Notice that the monopoly price is increasing in both the current and future equilibrium
price on the secondary market.
Oligopoly. G ￿rms that want to sustain the monopoly outcome as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in grim trigger strategies will charge price pm in every period as long as no ￿rm
undercuts this price. When a ￿rm does undercut, they set a price equal to c from that period
on. Recall that the demand function depends on the price history of new units, the stock of
used goods available and the present and future price of used goods. Thus, a forward-looking
consumer anticipating a price war in the next period will update his expectation regarding
6I consider a simple framework where consumers￿decision is not state-dependent in order to focus on the
central result of the present paper. Considering a more complicated model with state-dependent decisions
will not add any insight. In such a model both intertemporal substitution and resale value component of
demand will strengthen ￿rms￿ability to collude.
8the equilibrium price on the secondary market in the period following defection: A price war
will lead to overproduction of new goods and it might depress the demand for used goods
and drive down their equilibrium price. A lower expected price for used goods will reduce
the demand for new goods in the defection period. Again, part of the punishment may be
e⁄ected immediately, and this facilitates the monopoly-price outcome.
Lemma 2 After a defection, the equilibrium price on the second-hand market following a
grim trigger is positive if c > (1 ￿ ￿)￿l.
In the standard repeated Bertrand game, setting future price to marginal cost is the
maximum punishment that can be in￿ icted on a deviator. A future price below marginal cost
would not have a further impact, because the deviator would simply withhold production.
However, in a durable-goods setting, the market price anticipated by consumers for the
period following a unilateral price cut would a⁄ect demand in the defection period, i.e. an
anticipated price below marginal cost would reduce consumers￿willingness to pay for new
goods. Because of this e⁄ect, absent in repeated games, even harsher punishments than grim
trigger strategies are possible and pro￿ts in the defection period can be pushed below what
they would have been under grim trigger strategies.
De￿ne sharp grim trigger strategies as follows: initially all the ￿rms set pm and do so as
long as no ￿rm sets a lower price. In the period after deviation there will be a ￿
￿ 2 [0;c)
such that ￿rms post a punishment price for new units pP
t+1 ￿ ￿
￿7 to induce pU
t+1 = 0:8 Notice
that driving the expected price to zero completely removes the resale value component of
demand in the defection period. Because pro￿t after the defection period may be negative,
I assume that, in order to induce a Nash equilibrium in the stage game of that period, all
￿rms play the collusive price pm in every period, starting from t+2 with probability ￿; and
price at the marginal cost, c; with probability 1￿￿: I assume (as is common in the repeated
game literature) that ￿ is public. If any ￿rm does not obey the punishment pricing, the
others restart the punishment sequence. There is no incentive for any ￿rm to deviate from
the punishment pricing.




















The sharp grim trigger strategy supports pm as a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only
if the following two conditions hold:
7A grim trigger strategy will be su¢ cient to drive pU
t+1 = 0 as long as c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿l: As from lemma 2
the equilibrium price on the secondary market will be pU = maxf
c￿(1￿￿)￿l
(1+￿) ;0g 8￿ ￿ t + 1:
8Notice that in particular pU




































The ￿rst term in condition (3), ￿D
t ; is the pro￿t that the defector gets in the defec-
tion period (i.e. ￿D
t = ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c)nh).9 As described in (2), consumers see
a price pN
t lower than pm and so expect the price of used goods to be zero tomorrow




G ; is negative and is the loss supported by each ￿rm in the ￿rst punishment pe-
riod. The last term on the left-hand side is the share of the monopoly pro￿t earned (with
probability ￿) after the punishment period.10 On the right-hand side is the share of the
(steady-state) pro￿t that the defecting ￿rm would have earned if it had not defected, i.e.
￿m = ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)nh. In order to obtain subgame perfection such severe
punishment should be incentive-compatible, and this is guaranteed by (4). The ￿rst term
on the left-hand side of (4) represents the pro￿t for each ￿rm during the ￿rst punishment
period, and the sum of discounted pro￿ts thereafter, evaluated from the ￿rst period of obey-
ing the punishment. Because the ￿rst term is (possibly) negative, condition (4) requires this
present value to be non-negative; otherwise, ￿rms would do better by pricing at marginal
cost forever (or by leaving the market). The same condition requires the left-hand side also
to be non-positive in order to punish the defector more e⁄ectively.11 In the present frame-
work where there is dependence between the periods, sharp grim trigger strategies minimize
the incentive to defect:
Proposition 2 Sharp grim trigger strategies maximize the range of discount-factor values
over which collusion is sustainable.
9The defector has no incentives to sell the new units to all consumers.
10Notice that the pro￿t in each period depends on the number of new goods sold in the previous periods.
Hence in period t + 2; the monopoly pro￿t after a defection is not equal to the monopoly pro￿t in the
steady-state. There will be an excess supply of used goods that will a⁄ect the equilibrium price in the
second-hand market and consequently in the primary market. However from t + 3 onward the monopoly
pro￿t will coincide with the steady state one. With a slight abuse of notation in equation (3) and (4) I have
put a time index to the whole stream of pro￿ts that should be read as above.
11Lemma 4 in the appendix provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions that guarantee the existence
of the sharp grim trigger strategies.
10Proposition 3 The monopoly price pm is sustainable as an equilibrium in an oligopoly if
￿f ￿ ￿
￿
f = 1 ￿ 1
G￿￿: ￿
￿
f is a decreasing function of the quality of the used goods, ￿; and of
consumers￿discount factor, ￿, and is an increasing function of the distance of consumers￿
valuation from quality, ￿h ￿ ￿l.
This proposition shows that a higher quality of used goods implies a higher resale value
component and a harsher punishment in case of defection. This ￿nding suggests that an
increase in the number of competitors entering the market might induce ￿rms to coordi-
nate12 and increase the durability of goods in order to enforce collusion. The literature on
investment in R&D13 suggests that competition among ￿rms leads to an overinvestment in
R&D with respect to the level that maximizes the pro￿tability of a group. Each ￿rm takes
into account the bene￿ts from its investment, but not the positive externality due to the
reduction in the value of rivals￿investment. The results in the model seem to con￿rm these
￿ndings: the possibility of collusion might lead to an over-investment in durability with re-
spect to the level that maximizes monopoly pro￿t. If the number of competitors continues to
increase, ￿rms will eventually end up choosing a level of durability greater than the socially
optimal level.
More generally, there are two forces that will in￿ uence the choice of the durability of the
good and these do not necessarily move in the same direction. From the previous discussion,
the incentive for ￿rms to increase value ￿ is clear: However, increasing the quality of the used
good might reduce the level of monopoly pro￿t, depending on the relative importance of the
resale component versus the substitution component of demand. Hence, collective incentives
to increase the durability of the good may not be aligned with the monopoly incentive to
increase pro￿t.
Proposition 3 also suggests that a wider di⁄erence in consumers￿valuation of quality
makes the resale e⁄ect relatively less important for high-valuation consumers￿demand for
new goods (the equilibrium price on the secondary market is a function of ￿l) and the
punishment less e⁄ective. Finally, notice that when consumers are su¢ ciently patient, they
value the resale component more highly in the decision to buy new products, so that the
expectation of a price war will induce a considerable adjustment in their willingness to pay
for new goods. This implies that lower deviation payo⁄s and collusion are therefore easier
to enforce.
In the above analysis I consider the situation without transaction costs (T), but it is not
di¢ cult to extend the analysis to include transaction costs in the secondary market. For
su¢ ciently small transaction costs, the second-hand market is still open. If the transaction
costs are borne by the consumers who buy used goods, it is intuitive to derive that the
12Given that ￿rms produce a homogenous good.
13See Reinganum (1989), Hirshleifer and Riley (1979), Waldman (2003) for a survey.
11equilibrium price of used units is a decreasing function of the transaction cost (pU
t = ￿￿l￿T;
8t). A marginal increase in transaction costs will reduce the resale value e⁄ect and the ability
to punish a defector (
@￿
@T > 0). Hence the presence of transaction costs will not only reduce
a ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability,14 but also its ability to collude. This result is in line with the main
￿ndings of the present work: ￿rms may prefer to have an active and frictionless second-hand
market.
3 Closing the second-hand market
The used good is a cheap substitute for the new good. Thus, closing the used good market
may in principle be a pro￿table decision for a monopolist. However, as I described in the
introduction there are many example, in whiche manufacturers seem to intervene in the
opposite direction. In this section, I discuss the monopolist incentives and the collective
incentives to interfere with transactions in the secondary market. In particular, I shall only
discuss the case in which ￿rms choose whether to close the used market entirely or to keep
it open. I leave the discussion about di⁄erent strategies a⁄ecting the second-hand market
to the next section. Focusing on this case only will give me the opportunity to compare and
discuss how the presence of the second-hand market may facilitate collusion with respect to
existing literature (Gul, 1987 and Ausubel and Deneckere, 1987) where the good is durable
and consumers may make intertemporal substitution but there is no second-hand market.
Consider the same assumption as before wherein the good lasts two periods and it depre-
ciates in the second period. Closing the used market means that consumers can either scrap
or keep their used units but not buy and sell used goods (for example transaction costs are
so large as to prevent consumers from exchanging used goods). Without the second-hand
market, consumers can either buy a new good every two periods (keeping the used good for
one period), or they can buy a new good every period and scrap the used good.
Lemma 3 In the steady-state, consumers always prefer buying the new good every two pe-
riods if pN > (1 ￿ ￿)￿h.
Consider ￿rst how closing the used market a⁄ects monopoly incentives. Suppose the
monopolist is producing a steady-state ￿ ow of output in each period and always ￿nds it
pro￿table to sell the good only to the high type. There are two possible scenarios to consider.
The monopolist extracts all the rents from the high types by charging the monopoly price
pm = (1 + ￿￿)￿h; by lemma 3, consumers purchase the new good every two periods. Thus a
steady-state in the market is obtained when the population is split into two identical copies
14See for example Porter and Sattler (1999) or Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) for a formal derivation of
the equilibrium with transaction costs, and Schiraldi (2008) for an empirical analisis.
12of mass 1=2, one purchasing every odd period, the other purchasing every even period.
Alternatively the monopolist charges a lower price and sells the new unit to all consumers
at price pm = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h: Consumers buy the new product every period and scrap the used
one. The pro￿t in each period is respectively ((1 + ￿￿)￿h ￿ c)nh=2 and ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h ￿ c)nh:
The ￿rst strategy is better than the second if c > ￿h(1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿); which is always the case
if ￿ > 1
2+￿:
Proposition 4 The monopolist maximizes his pro￿t by closing the second-hand market if
c > (1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)(2￿l ￿ ￿h):
If the monopolist maximizes his pro￿t by selling the new goods to all consumers every
period, then the price and consequently the pro￿t are lower than the case with an active
second-hand market. With a second-hand market, the monopolist sells to all high types in
each period. If the monopolist maximizes his pro￿t by charging pm = (1 + ￿￿)￿h then the
monopoly price is higher without an active secondary market. However, the monopolist may
achieve a higher pro￿t with an active second-hand because of a more e¢ cient allocation of
new and used goods among consumers equivalent to an indirect form of price discrimination.
Whether the total pro￿t is higher or lower depends on the level of the marginal cost, the
di⁄erence in willingness to pay between high and low types and the quality of the used
good. In particular, monopoly pro￿t is always higher with the second-hand market than in
the alternative of selling to all consumers with high-valuation in every period at the price
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h:
Oligopoly. Consider now a setting with G ￿rms that want to sustain the monopoly
outcome as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in (sharp) grim trigger strategies. As in Gul
(1987) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) the possibility of intertemporally substituting
consumption, i.e. deciding when to buy durable goods based on the expected price for new
goods in the future, constrains the maximum price that a defector can charge in the defection
period, hence it reduces the prize that the defector could get by deviating. Consumers will
forgo the utility of buying a new good today if they expect its price to be substantially lower
tomorrow. The intertemporal link in demand introduces scope for harsher punishments in
case of defection as with the second-hand market. However, the mechanism through which
the extra punishment operates is di⁄erent with or without the second-hand market, and
consequently has di⁄erent implications in terms of the possibility to enforce collusion in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The range of discount-factor values over which collusion is sustainable is
maximized with an active second-hand market if and only if c > (1￿￿)￿h or c < ￿h(1￿2￿):
Collective incentives, i.e. the ability of ￿rms to sustain collusion, will depend on the level
of marginal cost. If the marginal cost is high (higher than (1 ￿ ￿)￿h) the mark-up with
13the secondary market is lower than without and a drop in price will have a relatively bigger





will be sustained under a broader range of parameter values with the secondary market. In
particular, if the marginal cost is higher than the price minus the resale value components
(i.e. (1￿￿)￿h+￿￿l); then the defector gets zero pro￿t in the defection period with an active
second-hand market. The situation is opposite for intermediate values of the marginal cost.
Notice that as the marginal cost decreases, the monopoly pro￿t with a secondary market is
likely to be higher than without.
Consider the case of no second-hand market. If the quality of the used good is low enough
(￿ < 1=2) consumers have a low incentive to forgo the utility from buying a new good today
if they have no good. Moreover, consumers with a used good and without the possibility to
resell it will be tempted to buy a new good and scrap the used one. If the marginal cost
is also low then the defector will further lower the price in the defection period to sell the
good to all consumers and maximize pro￿t. In such a situation the punishment in￿ icted on
the defector in the defection period is lower than with a secondary market and so the ability
to collude decreases. In particular, if the marginal cost is lower than (1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿h; ￿rms
achieve the highest collusive pro￿t by selling the new good to all consumers every period, but
consumers no longer have any incentive to make intertemporal substitutions. At this level
of marginal cost, ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to reduce the price charged to consumers so that
they will always buy a new good even if they have a used one (which they scrap). The lower
unitary mark-up is compensated by the possibility of selling new goods more frequently.
The lack of the intertemporal link in demand destroys completely the possibility of extra
punishment in the defection period.
The key element of the previous argument is that the leverage of ￿rms to sustain collusion
by punishing the defector in the defection period itself is linked with the ability of consumers
to intertemporally substitute consumption of the durable good. Such an incentive decreases
with the utility that consumers get from having a used good. The ability to sustain collusion
with a second-hand market instead decreases with the equilibrium price for used goods.
Even if both are a⁄ected in the same way by the quality of the used goods, they may
determine di⁄erent responses by the ￿rms which di⁄erentially a⁄ect the ability to collude.
Moreover, there are elements that a⁄ect either the used price on the second-hand market
or the ability to intertemporally substitute consumption but not both. For example the
presence of transaction costs if it does not prevent transactions on the second-hand market
will only reduce the equilibrium price of used goods and vice-versa low utility from keeping
a used good could be determined by factors that will not a⁄ect the equilibrium price in the
secondary market. Consider, for example, the situation in which the high types get positive
utility from having a new good but have no utility from having a used one (for any value of
14￿ arbitrary close to 1), whereas the low types get positive utility from both new and used
goods. A real-world example for this assumption could be the automobile market where high
types and low types are located in two di⁄erent countries E and I. The cars are produced
only in E. The country with high types has very stringent automobile safety and emission
standards that make the use of used cars extremely costly, but there are no such costs in the
country with low types.15 Assume for simplicity that the net utility from having a used car
is zero or negative. Hence, consumers in E have incentives to buy a new car every period.
Corollary 1 If there is no trade between the two di⁄erent types of consumers, the monopoly
pro￿t is lower as well as is the ability to enforce collusion.
Without the possibility of trading the goods between the two countries, ￿rms cannot
increase their pro￿t using the second-hand market as a form of indirect price discrimination.
Moreover, high-valuation consumers in E have no incentive to intertemporally substitute
consumption reducing the extra punishment in the defection period which strengthens the
ability to collude in a durable good environment. Notice that the gain from trade does not
derive from the presence of di⁄erent consumer tastes (which could also be the same), but
from the existence of asymmetric automobile safety and emission standards. No restriction
on the marginal costs are necessary.
4 Strategies a⁄ecting the second-hand market
The presence of the internet, lower transportation costs, and trade agreements have expanded
the scope for a second-hand market by reducing transaction costs. When ￿rms cannot
prevent a priori the possibility of reselling used goods on a decentralized market, it becomes
relevant to study how they can otherwise a⁄ect the secondary market and hence their pro￿ts
as well the ability to collude by using di⁄erent strategies.
In particular, I analyze three of the most relevant policies used in real-world practice:
leasing policy, buy-back policy and transferable warranty. The leasing policy allows the
manufacturer to directly control for the presence of used goods like automobiles in the
market (without any additional cost) and consequently to increase the monopoly pro￿t.
With leasing contracts, the manufacturer sells only the ￿ ow of service derived from products
for the length of the contract period. In such a situation there is practically no second-
hand market because no new durable goods are sold on the primary market. However, the
policy lessens the ability of ￿rms to sustain collusion. It follows that oligopolistic collective
incentives lead in the opposite direction from individual incentives. Firms that interact in
15See Clerides and Hajinyiannis (2008) for a more comprehensive discussion about the role of safety and
emission standards on monopoly pro￿t.
15a Bertrand fashion might therefore prefer the selling-only policy to the leasing strategy in
order to collect a positive pro￿t. The buy-back policy involves a ￿xed amount of money
o⁄ered by manufacturers (and usually determined in a contract) to buy back goods from
consumers willing to trade them in and buy new ones. The incentive for ￿rms is to stimulate
demand for new products by increasing the resale value e⁄ect and making used goods a
more expensive substitute for new ones. With the buy-back, the manufacturer is still able
to control the number of used goods available (at the cost of buying them back), but leaves
the second-hand market active. This preserves the intertemporal feature of demand for new
goods and makes collusion easier to enforce. A buy-back policy may not only increase pro￿t
with respect to selling, but it always strengthen collusion. A transferable warranty is also
a means to stimulate demand if it increases the resale value e⁄ect on demand relative to
the substitution e⁄ect. With the warranty, the manufacturer freely guarantees a certain
level of quality for the used goods (by ￿xing it if faulty). The warranty increases the pro￿t
di⁄erential in the defection period because it increases the level of the resale value component
and enhances the ability to collude. The warranty in￿ uences the price of used goods through
their intrinsic quality whereas buy-back a⁄ects it through market mechanisms. Whereas
leasing and buy-back are substitute policies, a warranty may be o⁄ered along with either of
them.
4.1 The Leasing Policy
Waldman (1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999a) show how the monopolist bene￿ts most
by leasing new goods rather than selling them.16 Leasing contracts achieve the result of
no active second-hand market because ￿rms retain ownership of new goods. With leasing
contracts, the manufacturer is able to sell only the ￿ ow of service derived from products
for the length of the contract period. In such a situation there is no second-hand market
because no new durable goods are sold on the primary market. Hence, leasing policy breaks
dynamic investment considerations to consumption decisions and lessens ￿rms￿ability to
collude. Therefore collective and individual incentives move in opposite directions.
Monopoly. We start the analysis by looking at monopoly behavior. Suppose that the
monopolist decides to lease new goods for one period (instead of selling them) in order to
gain additional power in the used market. The monopolist retains ownership of the goods
such that they have to be returned at the end of the contract. The consumer￿ s decision to
rent a new product does not depend on its resale value, but rather only on the substitution
16This result is obtained within a simple framework where there are no transaction costs, no lemon problems
on the second-hand market or moral hazard behavior. As described by Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) and
Huang, S., Yang, Y. and K. Anderson (2001), in a more realistic model with transaction costs and/or hidden
information, ￿rms prefer to o⁄er a mix of leasing and sales contracts.
16e⁄ect, i.e. the possibility of renting used goods instead of new ones. Consumer ￿i determines
his optimal consumption choice by solving:
maxf￿i ￿ l
N
t ;￿￿i ￿ l
U
t ;0g (5)
Of course the demand for new goods has no dynamic features.
Proposition 6 The monopolist always maximizes his pro￿t by leasing new goods rather than
selling them.








(or lN) in the initial period and continue to do so in all future periods as long
as no ￿rm undercuts these prices. After a defection ￿rms set the leasing price for new goods
equal to c and the leasing price for used goods equal to zero. Consumers will ￿rst lease
the good that delivers the highest utility. If they prefer the used good (for a given set of
parameters), they will lease all the used units available (on a ￿rst-come-￿rst-served basis)
and the remaining consumers will lease the new ones.17 Independently of the number of new
or used goods leased after a defection, the ￿rms￿pro￿t will always be zero. The leasing-only
policy always undermines ￿rms￿ability to sustain collusion.
Proposition 7 The leasing-only policy always raises the minimum discount-factor value
that supports collusion.
The above result suggests that, even if leasing achieves a higher (monopoly) pro￿t than
sales, at the same time it reduces the range of parameter values over which collusion can
be sustained in equilibrium. As it is clear from equation (5) there is no extra punishment
that can be in￿ icted on a defector in the defection period because there is no resale value
component in the demand of new goods. Therefore, the minimum discount-factor value that
supports collusion is ￿
l
f = 1￿ 1
G as in the standard case with no durable goods: It follows that
oligopolistic collective incentives lead in the opposite direction from individual incentives.
Firms that interact in a Bertrand fashion might therefore prefer a sales-only policy to a
leasing strategy in order to collect a positive pro￿t.
4.2 The Buy-Back Policy
Manufacturers can also increase their market power by employing a buy-back policy. As
a real-world practice, manufacturers o⁄er a ￿xed amount of money to buy back cars from
17Notice that the number of used goods available is constrained by the number of new units leased previ-
ously.
17those consumers willing to trade them in and buy new ones. The idea behind this policy is
that ￿rms interfere with the second-hand market by raising the demand of used goods and
consequently their equilibrium price. The incentive for ￿rms is to increase the willingness
to pay for new products by increasing the resale value e⁄ect and reducing the substitution
e⁄ect. With the buy-back, the manufacturer is still able to control the number of used goods
available, but leaves the second-hand market active. This policy is costly to implement
and may not necessarily increase monopoly pro￿ts. However, it preserves the intertemporal
feature of demand for new goods and always strengthens the ability to enforce collusion.
Monopoly. The monopolist can try to increase pro￿t by interfering with the second-
hand market and to gain additional market power by using the buy-back policy. The ￿rm
commits to buying and scrapping used cars for a given price. The equilibrium with com-
mitment can be obtained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the monopolist
establishes a reputation for eliminating the second-hand market. When the monopolist
achieves a higher pro￿t, the threat of moving to an equilibrium with an active second-hand
market prevents him from deviating by not repurchasing the used goods (see Waldman,
1997). For simplicity, I assume that the monopolist can commit to a buy-back price in order
to compute the monopoly outcome that ￿rms can support as a subgame perfect equilibrium
in grim trigger strategies. The commitment can easily be sustained because in real world
practice the buy-back price is written into the contract signed by both parties at the time
of a new purchase.
If the monopolist decides to apply the policy, the price (bU) o⁄ered to buy the used cars
back cannot be lower than the market price of used goods. Consumer ￿i determines his






where bU is the price at which a ￿rm commits to buy back used units.
Proposition 8 The monopolist maximizes pro￿t with the buy-back by choosing bm = ￿￿h
and pm = (1 + ￿￿)￿h 8t: In equilibrium all the high-valuation type consumers buy new goods
in every period and trade them in in the following period.
￿ The monopoly pro￿t with buy-back is higher than selling alone if ￿h > 1+￿
￿ ￿l.
￿ The monopoly pro￿t with buy-back is always lower than leasing.
This result shows that the monopolist can pro￿tably interfere with the second hand
market. The role of the buy-back is to in￿ uence positively the resale value e⁄ect by increasing
the price of used cars. The policy is pro￿table if there is a substantial di⁄erence in consumers￿
18valuations of the quality of the goods, so that the cost of implementing the policy is lower
than the bene￿t.18
Oligopoly. Firms can collude and sustain the monopoly buy-back equilibrium outcome
using sharp grim trigger strategies. Initially all ￿rms ask pm and o⁄er to buy back used
units at bm and continue to do so as long as no ￿rm defects. In the period after deviation
there will be a ￿




t+1 = 0 and the buy back price is no longer o⁄ered. As described in the previous
section, because pro￿t after the defection period may be negative in order to induce a Nash
equilibrium in the stage game of that period, I assume that with probability ￿ all ￿rms play
the collusive equilibria o⁄ering fpm;bmg from period t+2 onwards and with probability 1￿￿
they price at the marginal cost, c; without the buy-back policy. If any ￿rm does not obey
the punishment pricing in a punishment period, the others restart the punishment sequence.















t+1 = 0 if p
N
t 6= p
m and b = 0
Notice that in the defection period the ￿rm that under cuts pm continues to o⁄er the same
buy-back, any further reduction in the buy-back price will imply a corresponding reduction
in the under-cutted price. Consumers always have the possibility of selling the good on the
used market or to other ￿rms. The buy-back policy always enhances ￿rms￿ability to enforce
collusion with respect to a selling-only policy.
Proposition 9 The buy-back policy always reduces the minimum discount-factor value that
supports collusion.
Similar necessary and su¢ cient conditions can be derived for the existence of the sharp
grim trigger strategy that supports the monopoly buy-back equilibrium outcome as subgame
perfect equilibrium.
The buy-back policy always expand the scope for collusion and it might increase pro￿t
with respect to selling. Hence, collective and individual incentives are aligned if buy-back
is more pro￿table than selling, i.e. ￿h > 1+￿
￿ ￿l; and they diverge otherwise. The results
imply that to sustain collusion and share a positive pro￿t, ￿rms may use this policy even if
it reduces the monopoly pro￿t (as long as it is strictly positive).
18Notice that having no used goods available is a particular feature of the model with two types of
consumers. With a continuum distribution of consumers, used goods are always traded on the second-hand
market (Schiraldi, 2006).
194.3 Transferable Warranties for Used Goods
The scope for warranty exists in a world where there is uncertainty about the value of
used goods. As I discussed in the introduction, car and computer manufacturers provide
free warranties for used goods which are transferable between owners in order to improve
transactions on the second-hand market. Incentives to o⁄er transferable warranties may be
twofold. First, if the resale value e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect and the cost of
implementing the policy, ￿rms can achieve a higher pro￿t by increasing the average quality
of used goods. Moreover, and more central to my analysis, oligopolistic ￿rms always have an
incentive to o⁄er a warranty in order to enforce collusion (charge the monopoly price). By
increasing the average quality of used goods, ￿rms increase the punishment that they can
in￿ ict on a defector in the defection period, making defection itself less pro￿table.
Let me introduce uncertainty about the quality of the used good by assuming that quality
of the used good is a random variable equal to ! 2 (0;1) with probability ’ 2 (0;1) and 0
with probability 1 ￿ ’. Let ￿ = ’! be its expected value. The value of the used goods is
realized after the transaction so that there are no concerns about asymmetric information.
Each ￿rm may o⁄er the following warranty when they sell a new product: if the quality
of the used good in the second period is revealed to be 0, they can reinstate the quality
!: Firms pay a cost k for each product ￿xed.19 Consumer behavior will not change and in
particular the equilibrium price on the second-hand market will be pU
t = ￿￿l; if there is no
warranty and pU
t = !￿l otherwise: Similarly the equilibrium price in the primary market will
be respectively pm = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l and p! = (1 ￿ !)￿h + ! (1 + ￿)￿l.
Monopoly. The monopolist has incentives to o⁄er a transferable warranty along with
the new good when (a) it increases the overall willingness to pay, i.e. it increases the resale
value e⁄ect by more than the substitution e⁄ect and (b) the increase in price that follows
from the increase in the willingness to pay is higher than the expected cost of ￿xing the
good. More formally:
Proposition 10 The monopolist maximizes his pro￿t by o⁄ering transferable warranties if
and only if ! (￿l (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿h)(1 ￿ ’) ￿ k’ ￿ 0:
Oligopoly. Firms can collude and sustain the monopoly price, p!; with warranty in
equilibrium using sharp trigger strategies.20 Initially all ￿rms ask p! and o⁄er a warranty
and they continue to do so as long as no ￿rm defects. Similarly as before all ￿rms post a
price pP
t+1 < c to induce pU
t+1 = 0 and no warranty is o⁄ered: from period t + 2 onwards all
19Warranties are equivalent to improvements in the quality of a used good which is implemented with a
linear cost technology.
20Notice that p! is not necessarily greater than pm because the substitution e⁄ect may dominate the resale
value e⁄ect. Nevertheless ￿rms may prefer p! to sustain collusion.
20￿rms play the collusive price p! with probability ￿ and with probability 1 ￿ ￿ they price at
the marginal cost, c; without a warranty. If any ￿rm does not obey the punishment pricing
in a punishment period, the others restart the punishment sequence.





















The warranty always enhances ￿rms￿ability to sustain collusion.
Proposition 11 The warranty always reduces the minimum discount-factor value that sup-
ports collusion.
As for the buy-back policy collective and individual incentives are aligned if o⁄ering a
warranty is pro￿table, i.e. ! (￿l (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿h)(1 ￿ ’) ￿ k’ ￿ 0; and they diverge otherwise.
This suggests that if the number of competitors is such that, given the discount factor ￿f; the
monopoly outcome without warranty cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
in sharp grim trigger strategies (￿
!
f < ￿f < ￿
￿
f)21, ￿rms have an incentive to o⁄er a warranty
and charge p!; even if it reduces the monopoly pro￿t (as long as it is strictly positive), in
order to collect a positive pro￿t. Competition forces them to o⁄er a warranty for used goods
(or to use a buy-back policy) even if this is not optimal from a monopolist￿ s point of view.
Similar implications as in the warranty case apply in the decision of choosing the quality
ex-ante as also discussed at the end of section 2. The two arguments are complementary
because ￿rms can choose either the quality ! or the degree of uncertainty ’: There are
several explanations of why a ￿rm might prefer to o⁄er a warranty rather than to eliminate
uncertainty, i.e. ’ = 1. First, it might be cheaper to o⁄er a warranty and to ￿x the good
than to choose no-uncertainty ex-ante. Second, uncertainty about the quality may not be
related to the nature of the good, but to the use made of the good by consumers.
5 Conclusion
The aim of the present work is to analyze how the second-hand market in￿ uences the ability
of ￿rms to sustain collusion over time. I study ￿rms￿preference for having an active second-
hand market and whether policies that a⁄ect the functioning of the second-hand market
strengthen collusion.
21It is straightforward to see that leasing is not sustainable as collusive equilibrium either.
21The intuition is that the prospect of obtaining a high price on a second-hand market
increases demand for new goods. By threatening to price at equal to or even below marginal
cost in the post-deviation period, competing ￿rms can reduce or remove the resale-value
component of demand for new goods in the current period. A reduction in resale value
will also reduce the pro￿t from new goods in the defection period. In this view, ￿rms can
implement di⁄erent policies directed to strengthen sales on the secondary market so as to
increase the threat of punishment in case of defection.
The model predicts that for collusive purposes having an active second-hand market is
preferable every time the marginal cost of production is either high or low and there is a
sharp reduction in the quality of the durable good over time. More generally, the second-hand
market will be preferred for collusive purposes whenever consumer utility from keeping the
used good is low because it is costly to keep the good over time. Hence, I study the incentive
to interfere with an active second-hand market. In particular, I discuss how a leasing policy,
by eliminating the dynamic component of demand, reduces the range over which collusion can
be sustained, but increases monopoly pro￿t. Buy-back policy and warranty coverage favour
collusive behavior by increasing the market value of used goods (these policies increase either
the price or the quality of the used units) but they do not necessarily generate a higher level
of pro￿t.
I believe that the explanation provided in this paper suggests some further insights that
can illuminate durable-goods manufacturers￿behavior and further explain how the second-
hand market in￿ uences the primary market and interacts with it.
22Appendix
Proof Lemma 1. Each consumer ￿i solves in each period the optimal consumption
problem given the prices of new and used goods which can be formulated using Bellman￿ s
equation. There are two relevant cases:
￿ ￿If consumer i has no good at the beginning of the period then he can choose to buy
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￿ ￿if he already owns a good then he can choose to sell the used good on the secondary
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, Vit(1) ￿ p
U
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t + ￿Vit+1(1);￿￿i ￿ p
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(9) and (10) imply Vit(1) ￿ pU
t = Vit(0): Using the result in (9) or (10), it follows that
the consumer maximization problem is independent of his endowment:







Proof Proposition 1. The monopolist sells to high-valuation types only; there will be
nh used goods available on the secondary market in every period. Given that nh < nl; high-
valuation types capture the whole rent from low-valuation types. The competitive price on
the secondary market is pU = ￿￿l 8t. The maximum price that the monopolist can charge
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t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l:
Proof Lemma 2. There are two relevant cases to consider:
￿ if c > (1 + ￿￿)￿l low types will never ￿nd it optimal to buy new goods and the equilib-
rium price on the secondary market will still be ￿￿l:
23￿ if c ￿ (1 + ￿￿)￿l, the maximum price that high types can charge on the secondary
market must leave low-valuation consumers indi⁄erent between buying the new good and
keep it or buying the used good every period. In particular assume that low-valuation
consumers buy used goods if available when they are indi⁄erent. Then the continuation
values in these two scenarios are V1 =
(1+￿￿)￿l￿c
1￿￿2 and V2 =
￿￿l￿pU
1￿￿ respectively. Hence if
c = (1 + ￿￿)￿l ) pU = ￿￿l and if c < (1 + ￿￿)￿l ) pU =
c￿(1￿￿)￿l
1+￿ > 0 by assumption
a2.















Proof Lemma 4. The ￿rst inequality, the necessary condition, is derived by substituting
equation (4) in (3). The su¢ cient condition holds because of the following reasoning. Notice















: By the intermediate value theorem, f(0) < 0 < f(1) is su¢ -
cient for the existence of a probability ￿ 2 (0;1) such that condition (4) holds. f(0) < 0 is sat-


































((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)





Proof Proposition 2. Condition (4) assures that the present discounted payo⁄ after
a defection is equal to zero. This is the maximum credible punishment that can be in￿icted
through the continuation payo⁄ after a defection and still satis￿es individual rationality23.
By substituting equation (4) in (3), the minimum discount factor, ￿
￿
f; that sustains the equi-

















(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c
: Given that ￿m
is the monopoly pro￿t, the minimum ￿
￿
f is achieved by minimizing ￿D
t : From lemma 1 and
22Notice that in the period after the punishment there is an excess supply of used goods so the equilibrium
price on the second-hand market is zero.
23Firms always have the possibility of not producing and receiving zero. Zero pro￿t is also the outcome
of the one-period Bertand-Nash equilibrium.
24proposition 1, ￿D
t is a⁄ected by ￿rms￿future behavior through the resale value component
of the demand. Hence it is minimized if pU
t+1 = 0: By su¢ ciently lowering the price of
new goods (possibly below the marginal costs) in t + 1; all consumers will prefer buying new
products. Therefore the excess supply of used goods will drive pU
t+1 to zero.
Proof Proposition 3. Under sharp grim trigger strategies, consumers￿ expectations




















Therefore, pro￿t in the defection period is strictly less than the monopoly pro￿t in the industry
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((1 ￿ ￿)￿l ￿ c)￿￿
((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)
2 < 0.
Proof Lemma 3. If the steady-state price of new goods is equal to pN; consumers can
choose either to buy the new good and keep it for two periods or to buy the new good every
period and scrap the used one. The continuation values are V1 =
(1+￿￿)￿h￿c
1￿￿2 and V2 =
￿h￿c
1￿￿
respectively. The ￿rst strategy is better than the second one if pN > (1 ￿ ￿)￿h.
Proof Proposition 4. When the monopolist maximizes his pro￿t by charging pm =
(1 + ￿￿)￿h, the pro￿t is ((1 + ￿￿)￿h ￿ c)nh=2: By comparing the pro￿t with and without
second hand; it easy to verify that the pro￿t without a second-hand market is higher if c >
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)(2￿l ￿ ￿h) which is always greater than ￿h(1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿): Hence the
proposition follows.
Proof Proposition 5. By lemma 3 if the price of new goods in equilibrium is equal to
pN = c > (1 ￿ ￿)￿h; consumers prefer buying the new good and keeping it for two periods.
Consider three cases:
￿ If c > (1￿￿)￿h; the highest pro￿t is achieved by setting pm = (1 + ￿)￿h: Suppose ￿rms
follow the standard grim trigger strategy and charge a price equal to c from t+1 onward:
The maximum price pD
t that a defector can charge must leave consumers without the
good indi⁄erent between buying the good in t (and then keep it) and buying it tomorrow
at a lower price. Then: ￿h ￿ pD
t + ￿￿￿h + ￿




1￿￿2 ,which implies pD
t =
(1+￿￿)￿h+￿c
1+￿ . The lower the price charged after a
defection, the higher is the punishment in￿icted on the defector. The lowest price the
defector charges in t for any harsher strategy implemented is pD
t = ￿h. At this price the
defector sells the good only to consumers without it. However he may have an incentive
to further lower the price of new goods and sell to all consumers. The price should make
the consumers with a used good indi⁄erent between buying a new good in t (and buying
it again in t + 1) or keeping the used one, i.e. pD
t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h: The pro￿t in the ￿rst
scenario is higher if c > (1￿2￿)￿h (which is always true if ￿ ￿ 1=2) and in particular
is true in the case we are analyzing. The smallest ￿ without second-hand market is
￿without =
￿h￿c
(1+￿￿)￿h￿c: However, ￿￿ =
(1￿￿)￿h+￿￿l￿c
(1￿￿)￿h+￿(1+￿)￿l￿c < ￿without and therefore the ￿rst
part of the proposition is proven. Notice that ￿￿ = ￿without if c = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h.
￿ If (1 ￿ 2￿)￿h < c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿h then consumers with a used good will always buy a
new good and scrap the used one for any pN
t+1 ￿ c: Hence the maximum price that a
defector can charge in the defection period is pD
t = ￿h: The defector does not have an
incentive to further lower the price to sell to all consumers (see previous discussion).
It follows that ￿￿ > ￿without.
￿ If c ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿h; consider two cases:
￿ If (1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿h < c ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿h; the maximum price that a defector can
charge in the defection period is pD
t = ￿h; but he has the incentive to further lower
the price of new goods and sell to all consumers with high valuation (including
those with a used good). It follows that ￿without =
2((1￿￿)￿h￿c)
(1+￿￿)￿h￿c > ￿￿:
￿If c ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿h ￿rms maximize their pro￿t by selling the good to all
consumers with high valuation in every period at price pm = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h: In such
situation there is no longer any intertemporal link in the demand and so no extra
punishment can be in￿icted on the defector in the defection period, i.e. ￿without =
1 > ￿￿:
Proof Corollary 1. If there is no trade the monopoly price is pm = ￿h: Firms sell
the units to all consumers in every period; consumers scrap the used goods. There is no
intertemporal link in demand and ￿without = 1: If there is trade, consumers in country E can
sell their good to consumers in country I at price pU = ￿￿l 8t: Hence ￿rms charge a higher
price pm = ￿h +￿￿￿l (I assume that if there is free trade ￿rms prefer to sell only to the high
types): There is no substitution e⁄ect in this particular case because consumers in country
E will derive no utility from having a used good. At price pm = ￿h + ￿￿￿l ; total pro￿t is
higher, ￿rms sell the same quantity at a higher price and are able to punish the defection in
the defector period because of the presence of the resale value component.
26Proof Proposition 6. There are two relevant cases:
￿ The monopolist leases both new and used goods. The maximum leasing fee that the
monopolist can charge for a used good that makes low-valuation types indi⁄erent as to
whether or not they rent a used unit is lU
t = ￿￿l. Consequently the leasing fee for a
new product can be at most lN
t = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l: Overall, the monopolist￿ s pro￿t is
higher than selling:
((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c)nh + ￿￿lnh > ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)nh
￿ The monopolist chooses not to rent used goods and charge lN
t = ￿h:The latter strategy is
better than the former if (￿h ￿ c)nh > ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c + ￿￿l)nh , ￿h ￿ 2￿l
24: In
this case no used goods are available for low-types of consumer. The condition implies
again that the monopoly pro￿t under leasing is strictly higher than selling.
















The condition is equal to the usual condition that we have in the standard repeated game
model where ￿l = 1:
Proof Proposition 8. In order to a⁄ect the secondary market the monopolist has to
commit to and o⁄er a buy-back price bU 8t at least equal to ￿￿l. No consumers will sell a
used good to a ￿rm below this threshold and the policy is not binding.
The maximum price for new goods that a high-taste consumer is willing to pay is given




U = maxf￿￿h ￿ b
U;0g
There are two relevant ranges of values for b: If the monopolist commits to bU 2 [￿￿l;￿￿h];





minus the cost of carrying out the policy, b￿nh (the cost of buying back the used goods available
on the market). The pro￿t function is strictly increasing in bU:
@(pN￿c)nh￿bU￿nh
@bU = ￿ > 0.
Hence in this range the optimal buy-back price is bU = ￿￿h:
If bU > ￿￿h;the monopoly price is pN = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h+ ￿bU and the cost of the policy is
still bU ￿ nh; now that the pro￿t is strictly decreasing in bU: This implies that the optimal
strategy for the monopolist is b￿ = ￿￿h and p￿ = (1 + ￿￿)￿h: In each period, high-taste
consumers will sell used goods to the monopoly and buy new goods. It follows that the
24I am implicitly assuming that the monopolist never ￿nds it optimal to sell to all consumers.
27monopoly pro￿t is ((1 + ￿￿)￿h ￿ c)nh ￿ ￿￿hnh: The monopoly pro￿t is higher than selling
if ((1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)￿h ￿ c)nh ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c)nh , ￿h ￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿l. To prove the
last part we need to consider two cases: (i) if ￿h < 1+￿
￿ ￿l then the statement follows from
proposition 6 (ii) if ￿h ￿ 1+￿
￿ ￿l then we have (￿h ￿ c)nh > ((1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)￿h ￿ c)nh:
Proof Proposition 9. With buy-back we can de￿ne ￿bb =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h ￿ c
(1 ￿ ￿ + a￿)￿h ￿ c
; whereas
￿￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c
: It is straightforward to observe that ￿bb < ￿￿ or ￿l((1 ￿ ￿)￿h￿
c) < ￿h((1 ￿ ￿)￿h ￿c): Hence the minimum discount factor that sustains the monopoly out-
come with buy-back is always lower than ￿
￿
f:
Proof Proposition 10. The monopolist will o⁄er a warranty when it increases the con-
sumers￿willingness to pay and hence the price: pm = (1 ￿ ￿)￿h+￿(1 + ￿)￿l < (1 ￿ !)￿h+
! (1 + ￿)￿l = pw or ! (￿l (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿h)(1 ￿ ’) > 0 and if the bene￿t is greater than the ex-
pected costs: ! (￿l (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿h)(1 ￿ ’) > k’:
Proof Proposition 11. De￿ne ￿! =
(1 ￿ !)￿h + !￿l ￿ c ￿ k’
(1 ￿ !)￿h + ! (1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c ￿ k’
and ￿￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿￿l ￿ c
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h + ￿(1 + ￿)￿l ￿ c
: It follows that ￿!￿￿￿ = ￿
!￿￿l ((￿h ￿ c)(1 ￿ ’) + k’2)
(p! ￿ c)(p￿ ￿ c)
< 0; so
that the minimum discount factor that sustains the monopoly equilibrium outcome is strictly
lower with the warranty:
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